Tag Archives: afghanistan

Drugs and the CIA – Mexican Officials Blame CIA for Continuing Drug War

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/07/2012721152715628181.html

“It’s like pest control companies, they only control,” Guillermo Terrazas Villanueva, the Chihuahua spokesman, told Al Jazeera last month at his office in Juarez. “If you finish off the pests, you are out of a job. If they finish the drug business, they finish their jobs.”

A spokesman for the CIA in Washington wouldn’t comment on the accusations directly, instead he referred Al Jazeera to an official website.

CIA operations in war torn Mexico are allegedly under the auspices of combating the drug trade, presumably stopping traffic into America and other nations. The accusations of Mexico’s foremost drug warriors is an indication of the general atmosphere in Mexico surrounding the drug war: very grim.

However Villanueva’s accusations aren’t completely out of left field. As AJE points out, this wouldn’t be the first time there have been accusations of manipulation of the drug trade by the CIA. This is an organization that gets paid to be paranoid, and whose operations included the drugging of prostitutes with LSD and the aforementioned trafficking of cocaine in order to fund a puppet Nicaraguan government.

It’s impossible at this point to verify what the CIA’s involvement with the drug trade is. However I want to bring one more aspect of the drug trade into this strange discussion. The CIA can manufacture its own LSD, and seems to have the cocaine market on lock, so what’s left?

Heroin, of course!

It was recently revealed that Afghan heroin trade is up by about 3% (it’s like a Cost of Living Adjustment!), which suggests that all the posturing and worry over drugs done by the US government is either a farce, or it’s been grossly ineffective. We’ll give the USG the benefit of the doubt and say it’s both, but it’s been common knowledge that the military has been protecting poppy fields. Photos speak loudly. Fox News screams. Geraldo even says that destruction of poppy would put the troops at risk. Wait, so opium allegedly funds the Taliban (allegedly being the key word, they were taking down poppy growers under their reign of terror), but protecting poppy fields will protect Taliban money and protect American soldiers? I suppose that makes sense. Image


This, combined with the draconian drug war back home, is a pandemic of corruption. Drug money is big, larger than some national economies.

If this is a coordinated effort to control the illegal drug trade, what can we do to stop it?

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Rumors of Afghan jihadist activity in Mali

The US Department of State seems to be encouraging rumors that Afghans and Pakistanis are going to Mali to support some kind of jihadist insurrection. 

http://allafrica.com/stories/201206111449.html

Question: I’m wondering if the U.S. has any concerns or evidence that there is this sort of jihadi Afghan-Pakistan connection going on in northern Mali and what you think the current situation there might mean for international – the international community. I mean, does the UN have to get involved now?

MS. NULAND: Well, I’m going to take the part about Afghans and others from far afield ending up in Mali. You know how strongly we feel that the instability in Mali is endangering the security and providing an opportunity for all kinds of nefarious actors to exploit the territory of the country. 

The UN is probably prepping a “peacekeeping force” at this very minute. 

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Economic Theory Applied to Warfare: Adam Curtis on Counterinsurgency

http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis/2012/06/how_to_kill_a_rational_peasant.html

Adam Curtis always has penetrating insights and excellent research pieces on thoughtful topics. His latest piece on the history of counterinsurgency is superb, threading together American counterinsurgency in the war on terror with the French theorist that created it.

I wanted to draw attention to one aspect of the piece that I would have loved to see drawn out.

Curtis explains how traditional economic theories of rational actors began to be applied to the public at large in war torn countries as a method of understanding informants and non-traditional insurgent hierarchies. 

The new theory was called:

The Cost/Benefit-Coercion theory of Counterinsurgency

It still believed in Galula’s theory of putting the local population into protected villages and making them feel safe. But it gave up on worrying about what was in the villagers heads and treated them instead as self-interested “rational actors” who would respond in more or less predictable ways to incentives – and to disincentives.

The theory was picked up by the Executive branch and put into practice. Curtis goes on to explain that this method of counterinsurgency is often seen by proponents as war by another means: people are dying already, so does it really matter if there are fewer battles and more targeted assassinations? Vietnam became the proving ground for this American counterinsurgency theory, a discipline still in its infancy. This was the Phoenix Programme:

The aim of the protected villages and all the incentives was to separate the population from the insurgents. The next objective was to destroy the insurgents – and to do this the CIA set up what they called The Phoenix Programme.

But the documentary goes on to show how the Phoenix programme created something much worse – which it was powerless both to understand or to stop.

The Rational Peasant approach looked at Vietnam as a society of millions of self-seeking rational individuals. In reality, Vietnamese society was far more complicated. Extended families had tangled and intricate histories of relationships – some were friendly but many were driven by rivalries and hatreds.

As the film makes clear this had created a powerful tradition of violent retribution in Vietnamese society – and it goes on to show how some of the militias that the Americans had created used the free rein their masters gave them, to kill and torture not communists, but other, innocent civilians against whom they had long-standing grudges or hatreds.

After such experiences in Vietnam the whole idea of Counterinsurgency in the American military was discredited. It was buried away and forgotten.

Vietnam today is a different place, emerging from a war that plunged the entire region into darkness. What interests me are the cultural artifacts of such a conflict: what remains after an imperial presence that fosters a culture of assassination leaves? I suppose I need to brush up on my Vietnamese to answer that question. 

The most troubling aspect of his Curtis’ piece is that we are ready to repeat the same mistakes. 

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